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THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST LAW ON THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
Thomas D. Morgan*
L AW has ceased being a profession and has become a business.
This usually-critical assertion is often heard today,' and in signifi-
cant part it may be true. One measure of its truth-and a partial rea-
son for that truth-may be the fact that at least since 1975, the
standards and conduct of the legal profession have been subject to
scrutiny under the antitrust laws.2 This article examines how that
scrutiny came about, what has limited the apparent significance of the
new exposure, and some areas in which the antitrust laws may limit
lawyers' instinctive responses.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS
What we now call antitrust law did not begin in the United States.
Americans inherited the British law of restraint of trade as part of the
common law tradition.3 Since at least the seventeenth century, com-
mon law courts had been wary of monopoly of a market by a single
firm, especially where the monarch had granted the monopoly.4 The
courts had also examined contracts such as restrictive covenants upon
the sale of a business, finding some unreasonable and thus unenforce-
able restraints of trade, but others sufficiently limited in scope and
duration to be enforced.5 American states incorporated these com-
mon law principles in their statutes and decisional law.6
* Rex E. Lee Professor of Law, Brigham Young University; B.A. Northwestern
University; J.D. University of Chicago.
1. See Commission on Professionalism, American Bar Ass'n, In the Spirit of Pub-
lic Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986); Sol M.
Linowitz & Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the
Twentieth Century (1994); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71
Ind. L.J. 911 (1996). For a less critical account of the change, see Russell G. Pearce,
The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will In-
prove the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229 (1995); Deborah
L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 283 (1998).
2. The watershed case was Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975),
discussed extensively infra.
3. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade: A Legal
and Economic Analysis (1986).
4. See The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1603); see also William
Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act 19-22 (1965) (reporting Parliament's attack on Edward III by punishing a
monopoly granted by the King).
5. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
6. See Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modem Antitrust Law and Its
Origins 20-22 (1994) (citing authorities).
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The first federal antitrust legislation, the Sherman Act of 1890, was
thus a relatively late addition to the regulatory arsenal. Industrial de-
velopment in the last half of the nineteenth century made increased
efficiency possible through production on a larger and larger scale.
The states' restrictive treatment of business incorporation, in turn, had
made it difficult for existing firms to combine. To bypass that prob-
lem, firms used a business trust, an entity that would hold controlling
interest in multiple corporations and thus coordinate their activities.
Small business owners-often quite successful in a world now becom-
ing extinct-feared they would be driven out of business by firms con-
solidated in this way.7 They and the legislators sympathetic to their
plight were said to be "anti trust."8 Law firms, however, still tended
to be small and were not remotely in the target area of drafters of the
new antitrust legislation.
The first significant legal issue facing the new antitrust laws was
when federal law became applicable, rather than the preexisting state
legislation. The issue was posed in terms of whether the conduct of
the challenged firms was in interstate commerce. The first Sherman
Act case to reach the Supreme Court, United States v. E.C. Knight
Co.,' for example, involved the final consolidation of ninety-eight per-
cent of the nation's sugar refiners into one firm, American Sugar Re-
fining Co. The Court held there was no basis for federal jurisdiction
over the transaction,10 reasoning that sugar is refined in plants each
located within a single state.1 Although the sugar was clearly in-
tended for sale around the country and the world, refining is "manu-
facture" while "commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part
of it.",12
A second question, significant from the earliest days of the Sherman
Act, was what constituted "trade or commerce," the restraint or
monopolizing of which was prohibited by the antitrust laws. An early
series of much criticized Supreme Court decisions held that labor un-
7. See id. For a longer account of the legal and economic development, see Mor-
ton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy (1992); Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937
(1991).
8. Controversy about the objectives of the Sherman Act has existed since shortly
after its adoption. See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with
Itself (1978); Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an Amer-
ican Tradition 164-232 (1954). The best single source for the legislative history is 2
The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes, Part 1:
The Antitrust Laws % 15.1.1, 15.1.2 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978). The legislative de-
bates and multiple lines of concern expressed therein are summarized in Morgan,
supra note 6, at 22-28.
9. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
10. See id. at 17-18.
11. See id. at 10.
12. Id. at 12. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the effects of the consolidation
would be felt nationwide and that no single state would have the capacity to control it.
See id. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ions, for example, could be seen as cartels of workers engaged in trade
or commerce and that ordinary labor strikes were therefore illegal.' 3
Both the "interstate commerce" and "trade or commerce" ques-
tions were important because of a third unsettled issue, the reach of
the Sherman Act. Section 1 provides: "Every contract ... in restraint
of trade ... is declared to be illegal."' 4 Section 2 continues, "[e]very
person who shall monopolize... shall be deemed guilty."' For more
than twenty years, the Court split five to four over the significance of
the word "every."
To the Court majority, led by Justice Peckham, the term was self-
explanatory and meant that no evidence about the economic effect or
"reasonableness" of a trade restraint or market share would be admis-
sible.' 6 That helps explain why the Court took such a restrictive view
of what acts were in "interstate commerce" and came to restrict its
view of what was in "trade or commerce." Only by doing so could the
majority find principled bases to keep the Sherman Act from creating
both a federal commercial law and a federal labor law.
The artificial use of these concepts as a way of limiting the reach of
the Sherman Act is perhaps the best way to understand the Court's
otherwise-nonsensical decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs." The plaintiff
was a Baltimore baseball team that played in a league that wanted to
be merged into the major leagues.' When the major leagues admit-
ted some teams from the plaintiffs league but not the plaintiff, it sued
the major leagues for conspiring to monopolize the sport.' 9 A jury
agreed with the plaintiff and awarded substantial damages that were
then trebled pursuant to the statute.2
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, revers-
ing a lower court judgment on both interstate commerce and trade or
commerce grounds. Justice Holmes wrote for the Court:
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are purely
state affairs. It is true that, in order to attain for these exhibitions
the great popularity that they have achieved, competitions must be
13. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Professor Hovenkamp reports that
twelve of the first thirteen antitrust violations found by American courts before 1900
involved efforts to break strikes. Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 229. An important
reason for adoption of the Clayton Act in 1914 was its section 6 that provides "[the
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce" and hence is not
subject to antitrust prosecution. Further, in order to end the use of the antitrust laws
in labor cases, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), in
1932.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
15. Id § 2 (emphasis added).
16. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-29 (1897).
17. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
18. See id at 207.
19. See id.
20. See id.
19981
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arranged between clubs from different cities and States. But the
fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce
free persons to cross state lines . . . is not enough to change the
character of the business.... [Tihe transport is a mere incident, not
the essential thing.2 1
Then, in language that for many years gave lawyers comfort, Justice
Holmes continued:
That to which it [the transport] is incident, the exhibition, although
made for money would not be called trade or commerce in the com-
monly accepted use of those words. As it is put by the defendants,
personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of com-
merce .... [A] firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a
case, or the Chautauqua lecture bureau sending out lecturers, does
not engage in such commerce because the lawyer or lecturer goes to
another State.22
In the early years of the Sherman Act, a vocal minority, led by Jus-
tice White, argued that a "rule of reason" was implicit in the statutory
term "restraint of trade" which had come from the common law and
had been the basis for courts drawing distinctions based on reasona-
bleness for several hundred years.2 3 After Justice White was ap-
pointed Chief Justice by President Taft, 4 the "rule of reason" basis for
interpreting the Sherman Act prevailed and the need to restrictively
interpret interstate commerce and trade or commerce declined. 5
Nevertheless, in yet another case, FTC v. Raladam Co.,2 6 the Court
seemed again to suggest that lawyers might never be antitrust targets.
The case tested the FTC's jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.2 7 That section prohibits "unfair methods of
21. Id. at 208-09.
22. ld. at 209. Perhaps the best explanation for this decision was that the Justices
liked baseball and even under the rule of reason analysis then in use, there would
have been no good way to justify the league's monopoly. Certainly, that seemed the
basis for the Court's failure to retreat from the decision even a half-century later in
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
23. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 344-55 (1897)
(White, Field, Gray & Shiras, JJ., dissenting).
24. President Taft himself was one of the nation's best antitrust judges, having
created the "ancillary restraints" doctrine in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), when he was a judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. He seems to have known how he wanted the split on the Supreme
Court over this issue to be resolved.
25. The first case in which the "rule of reason" prevailed was Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Adoption of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, both in 1914, further clarified specific acts, such as mergers, that the
antitrust laws were meant to reach. They also permitted other conduct, such as
strikes, that the courts had mistakenly said the Sherman Act proscribed.
26. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).
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competition" and creates FTC jurisdiction over antitrust matters par-
allel to that of the Justice Department.2s
In Raladam, the FTC had proceeded against a firm that manufac-
tured an "obesity cure. '29 The manufacturer sold the product as a
way to dissolve excess human fat, but the FTC argued that the adver-
tisements for the "cure" were misleading in presenting it as effective
and safe.3" The Supreme Court held that whatever authority the FTC
might have over misleading advertising, it did not get it from section 5
of the Act.3' That provision, like the rest of the antitrust laws, was "to
protect small business against giant competitors. 32 The Court contin-
ued: "Of course, medical practitioners, by some of whom the danger
of using the remedy without competent advice was exposed, are not in
competition with respondent. They follow a profession and not a
trade."33 Thus, the "learned profession" exception to the antitrust
laws seemed to be confirmed, an exception which lawyers believed
protected them as well.
Throughout the 1930s, the rule of reason prevailed on questions of
substance, and law firms tended to be so small that they did not attract
antitrust attention. In 1940, however, interpretation of the antitrust
laws took an abrupt turn that ultimately caught even lawyers in the
antitrust net. A key part of the Roosevelt Administration's strategy
for dealing with the Depression was reflected in the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act ("NIRA"). It involved creating "Codes of Fair
Competition" in meetings of business, labor, and government repre-
sentatives that, had the firms been acting on their own, clearly would
have constituted criminal violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
The strategy was brought to an abrupt end, however, when the
Supreme Court held important parts of the NIRA unconstitutional.3"
That brought authority for concerted activity to an end, but it did not
always end the meetings. When President Roosevelt appointed Pro-
fessor Thurman Arnold to head the Antitrust Division and SEC
Chairman William 0. Douglas to the Supreme Court, enforcement of
the antitrust laws took on a new urgency.
28. See id § 45(b).
29. See Raladam, 283 U.S. at 644.
30. See id at 645-46.
31. See id at 654.
32. Id at 650.
33. Id at 653.
34. See Morgan, supra note 6, at 188-92 (describing this period); see also Ellis W.
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (1966) (analyzing the govern-
ment's response to monopolies and antitrust issues at the time of the depression);
Michael M. Weinstein, Recovery and Redistribution Under the NIRA (1980)
(describing the "codes of fair competition" and evaluating their success in promoting
recovery and redistributing income).
35. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
1998]
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In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,36 major oil companies
had agreed to buy surplus gasoline from their smaller competitors and
release it on the market so as to minimize price swings.37 Output was
reduced and prices measured over a reasonable span of time were not
increased, but in a unanimous opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas
held that any "combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing ... price" consti-
tuted criminal conduct, illegal per se.38 That is, once the coordinated
activity was proved, no evidence of justification for the common ac-
tion or "reasonableness" of the result achieved would be admissible.
In an even more sweeping restatement of the rule, the combination
was said to be illegal even though "no overt act is shown, though it is
not established that the conspirators had the means available for ac-
complishment of their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced
but a part of the interstate or foreign commerce in the commodity. '39
In that instant, not only was the dominance of the "rule of reason"
brought to an end, but the Court had to set about defining what was
per se illegal. Price fixing headed the list, but conduct subject to the
per se rule was later expanded to include: (a) division of markets, as
when one company agrees to sell only east of the Mississippi River
and a second company only west;4 ° (b) group boycotts, as when two or
more firms agree that they will not do business with a supplier who
does business with their competitors; 41 (c) resale price maintenance,
as when a manufacturer tries to have all retailers sell to consumers at
the same price;42 and (d) tying arrangements, as where in order to
lease a copy machine, the customer must buy all its copy paper from
the machine manufacturer.43
Simultaneous with development of the per se rule, however, the
Court acknowledged that the antitrust laws did not stand alone in reg-
ulating business conduct. Accommodation of federal regulatory pol-
icy with antitrust policy had been an issue since adoption of the
36. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
37. See id. at 178-98.
38. Id. at 223.
39. Id. at 225 n.59.
40. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
41. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466-67
(1941).
42. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). Resale price
maintenance had actually been held to be illegal during the first per se period, 1890-
1911, when every contract in restraint of trade was illegal. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
43. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (holding
that a tying arrangement is per se unreasonable and unlawful under the Sherman Act
if the seller has the power appreciably to restrain competition for the tied product,
and a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is affected); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (holding it per se violative of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts for a corporation to require lessees of its machines to use only
the corporation's unpatented products in them).
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Sherman Act," and the Court came to recognize that even state regu-
lation often required conduct that the antitrust laws would otherwise
prohibit.4" Thus, it had to decide which would prevail. It did just that
in Parker v. Brown.4
Parker v. Brown was decided only three years after Socony-Vac-
uum. Pursuant to the federal Agricultural Marketing Act, California
had adopted a program for marketing raisins, ninety-five percent of
which were sold out of state.47 Each California raisin grower was re-
quired to submit all of its production to a receiving station to be classi-
fied as standard, substandard, or inferior.4" Inferior raisins, deemed
unfit for human consumption, could only be sold for use as "by-prod-
ucts."49 In addition, up to twenty percent of standard and substandard
raisins had to be sold as by-products as well, and fifty percent had to
be put into a "stabilization pool," i.e., kept off the market to keep
prices up.50
Producers therefore could only sell thirty percent of their crop
through ordinary commercial channels, a result that one producer,
Mr. Brown, challenged as violating the antitrust laws.5' The Court
rejected his contention. It assumed that if the program had been
adopted by private persons, it would have been a per se violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 This, however, was a state-sanctioned
program:
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state....
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the
Act's legislative history.... That its purpose was to suppress combi-
nations .. .by individuals and corporations, abundantly appears
from its legislative history.
44. For example, in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
314-15 (1897), the court held that railroad regulation pursuant to the Interstate Com-
merce Act did not immunize from antitrust scrutiny a meeting among competing rail-
roads to decide what rates to propose to the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC"). In Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922), on
the other hand, the Court held that ICC regulatory authority would be undercut if
private plaintiffs could collect treble damages for ICC-approved rates that had been
proposed after such an illegal meeting. In Georgia v. Pennsylania Railroad, 324 U.S.
439, 451-52 (1945), however, the court permitted states to enjoin the illegal meetings.
45. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1943).
46. See id. at 350-52.
47. See id. at 345.
48. See id. at 347.
49. Id at 347-48.
50. Id. at 348.
51. See id at 348-49.
52. See id at 350.
1998]
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True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful ....
[But here, the state] as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act
of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to
prohibit.53
By the early 1940s, the Court was reluctant to indulge arguments
about limits on the federal commerce power,54 so that basis for pro-
tecting lawyers was weaker as well. The remaining question was
whether lawyers were engaged in trade or commerce, and that answer
was foreshadowed shortly after Parker in 1943 by AMA v. United
States.55
Group Health Association was an organization of federal employ-
ees that had employed doctors on a salaried basis to treat association
members on a pre-paid, risk-sharing basis, i.e., it was a very early
HMO. Such a method of providing medical services violated the
AMA code of ethics, and hospitals in the Washington area were per-
suaded by AMA-member doctors not to admit Group Health pa-
tients. In antitrust terms, that constituted a classic illegal group
boycott, but the district court had sustained a demurrer, stating that
neither the practice of medicine nor Group Health's business consti-
tuted "trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although the Court avoided declar-
ing head-on that medicine is a "trade," it still found doctors liable for
a Sherman Act violation. Group Health was in the business of ob-
taining medical care for its members on a pre-paid basis. The Sher-
man Act prohibits "any person" from restraining trade, so "the calling
or occupation of the individual physicians charged as defendants is
immaterial if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was ... ob-
struction and restraint of the business of Group Health. '56
By even the early 1940s, then, an impartial observer should have
been able to see that lawyers were potentially subject to Sherman Act
53. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). In follow-up litigation testing the scope of
the Parker "state action" exemption, the Court held that joint lobbying activities by
competitors and the meetings necessary to coordinate their approaches also were not
the kind of conduct the antitrust laws were designed to prohibit. See Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
54. Two of the key cases were United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
55. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
56. Id. at 528. In addition, in United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards,
339 U.S. 485 (1950), the court held that real estate brokers were not a learned profes-
sion and said "[t]he fact that the business involves the sale of personal services rather
than commodities does not take it out of the category of 'trade' within the meaning of
... the Act." Id. at 490.
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prosecution. Consequently it was fortuitous that it took thirty years
for the Supreme Court to confirm that reality.51
II. THE TURNING POINT-GOLDFARB V. VIRGINIA STATE BIR
Lewis Goldfarb was a lawyer working at the Federal Trade Com-
mission in Washington, D.C. He and his wife wanted to buy a house
in Reston, Virginia, a town near Washington in Fairfax County. Their
prospective mortgagee required them to get title insurance. That, in
turn, required a title opinion that could only be rendered by a member
of the Virginia State Bar. The first lawyer whom they contacted
quoted them a fee of one percent of the price of their new house, the
precise rate specified in a minimum fee schedule published by the
Fairfax County Bar Association. The Goldfarbs then contacted thirty-
six other lawyers by mail, and nineteen replied. None would examine
a title for less than the one-percent fee and several said that they knew
of no other lawyer who would do so."
The "suggested" minimum fee schedule was not on every lawyer's
desk. It was described as "advisory," and to see it at all, lawyers had
to specially ask for it at the courthouse. "Nevertheless, the fee sched-
ule states that its 'consistent and intentional violation ... for the pur-
pose of increasing business can, under given circumstances, constitute
solicitation"'59 of legal business, a violation of the Virginia lawyer dis-
ciplinary rules.6"
Stymied in their attempts to find a lower-priced lawyer, the
Goldfarbs filed a class action suit against both the Fairfax County Bar
Association (a voluntary association) and the Virginia State Bar (a
state agency), alleging price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.6' The district court found the county bar guilty of such a
violation. "Minimum fee schedules are a form of price fixing," the
court said, and "'price fixing is per se an unreasonable restraint of
57. The point did not go entirely unnoticed. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan. Where
Do We Go from Here with Fee Schedules, 59 A.B.A. J. 1403 (1973) (warning of the
possibility that attorney fee schedules may be a violation of the Sherman Act); Note,
The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Conmmercial"
Activities, 82 Yale L.J. 313 (1972) (discussing the Sherman Act's applicability to the
legal profession).
58. These facts are taken from the Supreme Court opinion. See Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 775-76 (1975). The case was tried in the District Court
in part on stipulated facts incorporated in the opinion by reference. See Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 492-93 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
59. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1974), rel"d, 421 U.S. 773
(1975).
60. The Virginia State Bar had announced an intention to impose discipline on
this basis. See Virginia State Bar, Op. 98 (1960). The County bar fee schedule closely
followed the "guidelines" set forth by the State Bar. See id.
61. They also sued the Arlington County Bar Association and the Alexandria Bar
Association, both of whom agreed to cancel their fee schedules and never reinstate
them. See Goldfarb, 497 F.2d at 3 n.1.
1998]
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trade. It is not for the courts to determine whether in particular set-
tings price-fixing serves an honorable or worthy end." 6
The argument the County Bar presented in favor of percentage fees
was that they resulted in overcharging some clients so as to be able to
undercharge others. That, Judge Bryan said, "is sufficient for the
Court to infer, which it does, that some damage resulted to the plain-
tiff.'"63 The court also found that interstate commerce was clearly af-
fected by the fee schedule. The title search was done as a requirement
of the Goldfarb's mortgage, and
a significant portion of funds furnished for the purchasing of homes
in Fairfax County comes from without the State of Virginia... [,] a
large percentage of persons who live in Fairfax County work outside
of Virginia and that significant amounts of loans on Fairfax County
real estate are guaranteed by the United States Veterans Adminis-
tration and Department of Housing and Urban Development, both
headquartered in the District of Columbia.64
The title search thus was an integral part of an interstate financial
transaction and a basis existed for antitrust jurisdiction .6
As for the "learned profession" exemption, the Court found:
"The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services
rather than commodities does not take it out of the category of
'trade."' [Indeed, tihe Court has some question whether the adop-
tion of a minimum fee schedule is itself "professional." . . . [That
term] properly contemplates differences in abilities, worth and ener-
gies expended of those rendering the services. Such differences are
made as meaningless by a minimum fee schedule as they would be
by a maximum fee schedule .... Certainly fee setting is the least
"learned" part of the profession.66
Finally, the District Court found that, while the Virginia State Bar had
acted within its "statutory or rule-created authority" and thus was not
liable to the Goldfarbs pursuant to Parker v. Brown, the conduct of
Fairfax County's "voluntary" Bar was not similarly protected.67
Both the County Bar and the Goldfarbs appealed to the Fourth Cir-
cuit. On the application of Parker v. Brown, the Court said that the
restrictions had to be an integral part of state regulation, not imposed
after the fact to ratify private conduct.68 Minimum fee schedules were
62. Goldfarb, 355 F. Supp. at 493 (citing United States v. National Ass'n of Real
Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950)).
63. Id. at 494.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 495 (quoting United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485, 490 (1950)).
67. See id. at 495-96.
68. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 6-10 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). The case the court contrasted with Parker was Asheville Tobacco
[Vol. 67
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said to be an example of the former, so the State Bar was entitled to
Parker immunity.69
We cannot ignore the fact that in some instances adherence to a
suggested minimum fee schedule is financially helpful to the individ-
ual attorney. Still, minimum fee schedules are only one factor
among a multitude of variables that interrelate to provide the public
with competent legal service.... It is manifestly unfair to dissect a
state's regulatory program into its various component parts, parts
that were meant to interrelate, and then to declare that, because
some factors may benefit those to be regulated, the program falls
outside the Parker exception.70
The Fourth Circuit declined to extend Parker protection to the County
Bar,71 and found it "abundantly clear... that the fee schedule and the
enforcement mechanism supporting it act as a substantial restraint
upon competition among attorneys practicing in Fairfax County."'
On interstate commerce and learned profession grounds, however,
the court sustained the County Bar appeal. 73 On the learned profes-
sion issue, the court wrote: "We do not intend to suggest that any
learned profession is above the law. The 'learned profession' exemp-
tion is... applicable only to those maters with respect to which an
accord must be reached between the necessities of professional regu-
lation and the dictates of the antitrust laws."'74 But, consistent with its
Parker analysis, it found that fee schedules were part of an integrated
system of regulation, no part of which could be condemned separately
from the whole.75
As for the interstate commerce question, the court noted that all of
the acts complained of occurred within Virginia and thus concluded
they had no "direct and substantial" effect on commerce.76 The fact
the Goldfarbs worked in Washington and that their mortgage funds
came from out of state constituted no more than an "incidental" effect
Board of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959), in which it had found such an
attempted after-the-fact ratification of price fixing in tobacco markets.
69. See Goldfarb, 497 F.2d at 9-10.
70. Id at 10 (footnotes omitted). The court later considered whether the fact the
leadership of the State Bar was composed of the very persons to be regulated re-
quired reexamination of this conclusion. See id. at 11. It found that the Virginia
Supreme Court expressly gave the Bar authority to create fee schedules and relied on
them in setting court-awarded fees. See id. That involvement of the court was deemed
sufficient to constitute active supervision of the State Bar by independent state offi-
cials. See id.
71. See id. at 12.
72. Id. at 13.
73. See id at 15-16.
74. Id. at 15.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 16.
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on commerce, not enough to support jurisdiction to invoke the Sher-
man Act.77
In the Supreme Court, however, the Goldfarbs prevailed on every
issue,78 and the Court's decision was unanimous.79 On the question of
price fixing, Chief Justice Berger wrote for the Court that in the mini-
mum fee schedule, "a naked agreement was clearly shown."8 It was
enforced not only by prospective discipline but also by "the desire of
attorneys to comply with announced professional norms."si The fact
that the Goldfarbs found no actual price competition further showed
this to be "a classic illustration of price fixing."8" Interstate commerce
was affected because title examinations were an integral part of the
"interstate aspects of [financing] real estate transactions. 8 3
Parker v. Brown, in turn, did not protect even the State Bar because
the Virginia Supreme Court had not required the promulgation of fee
schedules. Instead, "[t]he State Bar, by providing that deviation from
County Bar minimum fees may lead to disciplinary action, has volun-
tarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity,
and in that posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act. "84
But it was the Court's rejection of the learned profession exemption
that has had the most direct effect on lawyers and other professionals.
The Court could not have been clearer:
The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanc-
tuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public-service aspect of pro-
77. See id. at 18. Judge Craven dissented. He believed the Washington, D.C.,
housing market was multi-state and therefore interstate in character, such that in-
creasing the price of Virginia real estate through use of a minimum fee schedule inevi-
tably affected Maryland and D.C. transactions as well. See id. at 21-22 (Craven, J.,
dissenting). He further argued that the so-called learned profession exemption was
based on dicta and could not be justified or explained on any principled basis. See id.
at 23-24 (Craven, J., dissenting).
78. The United States appeared amicus curiae on the side of the Goldfarbs in the
person of Solicitor General Robert Bork, who had made his academic reputation pri-
marily as an antitrust scholar. Much of his work is collected in Bork, supra note 8.
His appearance was consistent with the Government's position on minimum fee
schedules in United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Or. 1974), a case
filed by the Justice Department but trailing Goldfarb in its passage through the
courts. The district court in Oregon rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis, see id. at
512, and it seems likely the existence of the public action and the resulting split of
authority helped persuade the Supreme Court of the significance of the antitrust is-
sues presented.
79. Justice Powell, a member of the Virginia Bar and former President of the
ABA, did not participate in the decision. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 774 (1975).
80. Id. at 782.
81. Id. at 781.
82. Id. at 783.
83. Id. at 785.
84. Id. at 791-92. As seen later, by current standards, this was an unduly narrow
reading of the Parker exception. See infra text accompanying notes 135-68.
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fessional practice controlling in determining whether § 1 includes
professions. Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in § 1
... and to read into it so wide an exemption as that urged on us
would be at odds with that purpose.
8 5
Certainly, no exemption is found in the text of the Act; "[l1anguage
more comprehensive is difficult to conceive."'  The Court read the
terms "trade or commerce" literally:
Whatever else it may be, the examination of a land title is a service;
the exchange of such a service for money is "commerce" in the most
common usage of that word. It is no disparagement of the practice
of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has this business as-
pect.... In the modem world it cannot be denied that the activities
of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and
that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on
commerce.
8 7
In closing, however, the Court backed off a bit from the otherwise
clear implications of its holding. In part, the language seems to be a
salve for bruised professional egos, but later cases have demonstrated
its importance:
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the prac-
tice of professions within their boundaries, and that ... they have
broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions. We also recognize that in
some instances the State may decide that "forms of competition
usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical stan-
dards of a profession." The interest of the States in regulating law-
yers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering justice, and have histori-
cally been "officers of the courts." In holding that certain anticom-
petitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act
we intend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its
professions.8s
III. THE IMPACT OF GOLDFARB ON PROFESSIONS GENERALLY
Ironically, the principal impact of Goldfarb has been on other pro-
fessionals, not lawyers. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has moved
away from rigid application of the per se rule to several important
areas of previous antitrust concern. Mergers,s9 vertical allocation of
85. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 (citations omitted).
86. Id. (quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
553 (1944)).
87. Id. at 787-88. Such an analysis is at the heart of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al.,
Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services,
58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1084 (1983).
88. 421 U.S. at 792-93 (citations omitted).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)
(adopting more restrictive market definitions than the Court had previously used and
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territories,90 group boycotts,91 monopoly behavior,' and even tying
arrangements 93 have come to be analyzed either under a "rule of rea-
son" or something closely approaching it. The subject of Goldfarb-
price fixing among competitors-remains largely subject to per se pro-
hibition,94 and extension of the antitrust laws to all professionals is
clearly here to stay.95
That extension was confirmed three years after Goldfarb in Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.96 The code of
ethics for civil engineers provided that engineers could not participate
in a process where price was part of the initial selection criteria. 97 The
client could make price a factor in its selection of an engineer, of
course, but the client's initial selection had to be based on the quality
of the engineer's prior work.98 If the price offered by the best engi-
neer was unsatisfactory, the client could negotiate with the second
best engineer, and so on.99 The engineers argued that selection based
primarily or solely on price would tend to reduce the safety of
projects, and offered this as an answer to the Justice Department's
petition to nullify the rule.100
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the lower courts that no
such defense was available in a case brought under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' The Society's rule did not constitute price fixing, the
foreshadowing the present relatively tolerant judicial attitude toward mergers);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (same).
90. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Continen-
tal T.V. is the case most often seen as the turning point away from the post-1940 per
se era of antitrust law to the more nuanced analysis used today.
91. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
92. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986) (adopting a more restrictive interpretation of what constitutes proof of preda-
tory pricing).
93. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (failing
to adopt a rule of reason analysis but restricting the availability of the per se rule).
94. But see, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (allowing a defense that price fixing contributes to efficient functioning of a
market to avoid the per se rule and permitting blanket licensing under a rule of rea-
son analysis).
95. For a contemporaneous analysis of these developments, see Philip C. Kissam,
Antitrust Law and Professional Behavior, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1983); Panel, Antitrust
and the Professions: Conflict or Accommodation?, 52 Antitrust L.J. 161 (1983). In
some of the cases that followed, the Court suggested a rule of reason will be em-
ployed in cases involving professionals. The practical effect of that concession, how-
ever, has been small, given the Court's willingness only to consider the competitive
consequences of a rule. See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978).
96. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
97. See id. at 683.
98. See id. at 684.
99. See id. at 684 n.6.
100. See id. at 685.
101. See id. at 689-90.
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Court acknowledged, because competitors did not agree what prices
to charge. 10 2 But the rule constituted a restraint on "the ordinary give
and take of the marketplace,"'1 3 and thus violated section 1. Further-
more, not only was the "learned profession" exemption irrelevant to
the Court, even the special importance of the subjects with which pro-
fessionals deal was irrelevant to antitrust analysis."° In looking at a
restraint of trade, a court may only consider:
[T]he competitive significance of the restraint; it [may not] decide
whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest ....
Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision has
been made by the Congress ....
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ulti-
mately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also bet-
ter goods and services.... Even assuming occasional exceptions to
the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy
precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad.l0 6
That message was reaffirmed in 1984 in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society.'07 Phoenix doctors who did not work for
HMOs got together to set the maximum fees they would charge for
designated procedures. 08 Working in conjunction with health insur-
ance companies serving the area, they established a system that gave
patients the same type of one-price, full-service care offered by
HMOs, but with a free choice among physicians."° The Court held
the plan per se illegal:
Nor does the fact that doctors-rather than nonprofessionals-are
the parties to the price-fixing agreements support the respondents'
position.... The respondents do not [even] argue, as did the de-
fendants in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, that the quality of
the professional service that their members provide is enhanced by
the price restraint.... [T]he claim that the price restraint will make
it easier for customers to pay does not distinguish the medical pro-
fession from any other provider of goods or services.1
0
102. See id at 692.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 695-96.
105. Id. at 692 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 695. For an attempt to model the economic effects of professional stan-
dards, see John E. Lopatka, Antitrust & Professional Rules: A Framework for Analy-
sis, 28 San Diego L. Rev. 301 (1991).
107. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
108. See id. at 339.
109. See id. at 341.
110. Id. at 348-49. The fact that the plan involved setting of maximum prices also
did not help the doctors. Maximum price fixing had been held per se illegal in Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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Dentists, in turn, found no more sympathy from the Court two
years later in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists."' The respon-
dents became upset when dental insurers demanded that they send
patient x-rays to the insurers so that they could verify the need for
treatment. 112 In terms that sound familiar today, the dentists objected
to cost accountants intruding into decisions about patient care.' 1 3
They formed a "union" and decided not to cooperate with the insur-
ers' demands, an action challenged by the FTC on the ground that the
dentists were primarily seeking to improve their own incomes. The
Supreme Court agreed with the FTC,114 and found that the dentists'
action "impairs the ability of the market to advance social welfare by
ensuring the provision of desired goods and services to consumers at a
price approximating the marginal cost of providing them.' 5 Quality
of care arguments were unconvincing and irrelevant to the Court, and
the dentists were ordered to cease and desist from their conduct. 16
Patrick v. Burget"7 further illustrated just how far professional lia-
bility could reach. A doctor who wanted medical privileges at a local
hospital had previously refused to join the private clinic in which most
of the town's doctors practiced." 8 When the doctor was denied privi-
leges based on the adverse recommendation of the hospital's peer re-
view committee, he sued the committee members, alleging that the
action was a group boycott by members of the private clinic in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.119
The Court of Appeals ruled that the claim was barred by Parker v.
Brown. ° Peer review committees are mandated by state law and su-
pervised by the State Health Division, the Court reasoned, and if they
are to be free to protect patients from bad doctors, they in turn need
protection from suits filed by doctors dissatisfied by their decisions.2'
But again, the Supreme Court reversed.'2 2 Hospitals are required to
have peer review committees, it said, but the State does not actively
111. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
112. See id. at 449.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 451-53.
115. Id. at 459. The dentists abandoned the claim that their dental "union" was the
kind of employee organization that section 6 of the Clayton Act intended to insulate
from antitrust liability. See id. at 451.
116. See id. at 462-64.
117. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
118. See id. at 96.
119. See id. at 97-98.
120. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943)).
121. See id.
122. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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review the substance of their decisions.12 3 The committee members
were thus exposed to potential treble damage liability. 124
IV. CASES IN WHICH LAWYERS HAVE AVOIDED
ANTITRUST LIABILITY
Of course, the fact that lawyers are subject to the antitrust laws is
only the beginning of the inquiry in any given case. For example,
sometimes plaintiffs throw an antitrust count into a case involving law-
yers that clearly does not state a valid antitrust claim. Amey, Inc. v.
Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc.,2 5 is typical of a series of cases212 in which
borrowers complained that banks required them to pay for title opin-
ions issued by lawyers chosen by the banks. That, the borrowers said,
constitutes a tying arrangement in which in order to get what they
want-the mortgage-they have to pay for something they do not
want-the title opinion.1 27 Courts consistently reject such claims.2
First, the banks lack the market power required under the tying doc-
trine to compel borrowers to use bank-approved lawyers and, second,
the loan and the title opinion should be viewed as a single product so
that no tying is involved.1 29
In Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, /InC.,130 a lawyer unsuccessfully
complained that he could not buy a listing in the biographical section
of the defendant's directory because he had not yet earned the "rat-
ing" Martindale-Hubbell required. The court held the defendant's
choice of rating criteria was made unilaterally and thus could not con-
stitute a group boycott. 131 Furthermore, some other courts have held
that the fact the ABA had criteria to determine in what law lists law-
123. See Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1506.
124. Congress has since expressly insulated most peer review decisions from anti-
trust liability in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101
(1994). In two earlier cases, courts had sustained charges that physicians' efforts to
deny hospital privileges to chiropractors and osteopaths constituted group boycotts.
See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984); Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207 (7th
Cir. 1983).
125. 758 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1985).
126. Other cases include Sibley v. Federal Land Bank, 597 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1979),
Foster v. Maryland State Savings & Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978), Forrest
v. Capital Buildings & Loan Ass'n, 504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974), and Mortensen v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, No. 1763-73, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16505
(D.NJ. Aug. 20, 1975).
127. See Amey, 758 F.2d at 1491-92.
128. See id. at 1502-03.
129. See also Guzik v. State Bar, No. B-78-300, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15180 (S.D.
Tex. July 29, 1980) (holding that it was not price fixing for a debt collector to use a
State Bar form saying the attorney's fee will be ten percent of sums recovered);
Hearity v. Board of Supervisors, 437 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1989) (holding that a county's
hiring of three lawyers to handle all publicly-funded criminal defense does not consti-
tute price fixing).
130. 659 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1981).
131. See id. at 436.
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yers could ethically advertise did not constitute a conspiracy between
Martindale-Hubbell and the ABA.132
By far the most important doctrine insulating lawyers from liability
has turned out to be the Parker v. Brown "state action" exemption.
The defense had been rejected in Goldfarb, of course, but the appro-
priateness of state professional regulation had been acknowledged
and applied in other contexts, and has greatly reduced the impact of
the antitrust laws on lawyers. 133
Bates v. State Bar,' for example, is best remembered as the case
holding restrictions on lawyer advertising unconstitutional. Of almost
equal importance, however, was its rejection of a Sherman Act chal-
lenge to the prohibition of lawyer advertising.'35 In Goldfarb, the
Court said, the Virginia Supreme Court did not compel the promulga-
tion of a minimum fee schedule, whereas the Arizona Supreme Court
had specifically prohibited lawyer advertising in DR 2-101(B) of its
Code of Professional Responsibility.136
132. See Saxe, Bacon & Bolan v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 710 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1983); cf Paralegal Institute, Inc. v. ABA, 475 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding
that the ABA's failure to accredit a paralegal school amounts to neither a group boy-
cott of the plaintiff nor a monopolization of the legal profession).
133. The Goldfarb Court noted:
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to pro-
tect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad
power to establish standards for . . . regulating the practice of profes-
sions.... [W]e intend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate
its professions.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975).
134. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
135. See id. at 362-63.
136. See id. at 359-60 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790). A second ground for the
Court's holding involved its distinguishing Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976), in which a private utility, the sole supplier to southeastern Michigan, had been
unable to claim the state regulation exception for its self-initiated program of distrib-
uting free light bulbs to its customers. By contrast, the Court said, a challenge to the
Arizona lawyer advertising prohibition was in effect a suit against the Arizona
Supreme Court itself, and "Federal interference with a State's traditional regulation
of a profession is entirely unlike the intrusion the Court sanctioned in Cantor." Bates,
433 U.S. at 362 (footnote omitted).
Bates was closely followed, in turn, by Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v.
Bate, 582 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1978), filed against the Advisory Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics of the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Committee had issued an opin-
ion prohibiting lawyers from listing themselves in local Yellow Pages advertising. See
id. at 709. The Court recognized the case as different from Bates but it reached the
same result. See id. at 710-11.
Defendants here were not enforcing a clear command of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, but were interpreting an unclear command and enforcing
their interpretation. However, in contrast to Bates and Goldfarb, defendants
here were acting as part of an agency created by the New Jersey Supreme
Court for the sole purpose of serving the state. Thus, while the relationship
between the Committee's activity and the command of the state is not as
close as that relationship in Bates, the relationship between the Committee
as an entity and the State Supreme Court is closer.
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Next, Hoover v. Ronwin 137 examined the possible antitrust liability
of bar examiners for "artificially reducing the numbers of competing
attorneys in the State of Arizona. ' 138 Ronwin had failed the Arizona
bar examination, given under the authority of the Arizona Supreme
Court but prepared and graded by the Court's Committee on Exami-
nations and Admissions. 139 After failing to persuade the Arizona
Supreme Court to admit him in spite of his exam score, Ronwin sued
the Committee members individually, alleging they were part of a
conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4' The district
court dismissed the claim, citing Parker, but the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding that a hearing was required to determine whether the
state regulation exemption applied.1 4
1
The Supreme Court disagreed. 42 Hoover and his colleagues were
selected and appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court and conceded
to be state officers, the court said.143 They acted pursuant to explicit
Arizona Supreme Court rules as to the subjects to be tested, and that
court had approved the scoring system that Ronwin complained
about. 44 Ronwin had been given a right to challenge the scoring sys-
tem and the court itself made the final decision denying his admission
to practice. 145 The court concluded: "Thus, the conduct that Ronwin
challenges was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court.... It
therefore is exempt from Sherman Act liability under the state-action
doctrine of Parker v. Brown.' '1
46
Id- at 718-19. Doctors, lacking an official agency through which to write their ethical
standards into law, have been ordered to cease and desist from asserting ethical limits
on advertising. See AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1980).
137. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
138. ld. at 565 (footnote omitted).
139. See id. at 560-61.
140. See id. at 564-65.
141. See Ronwin v. State Bar, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub non., Hoover
v. Ronwin, 464 U.S. 810 (1983).
142. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567.
143. See id. at 572.
144. See id. Between the decision in Bates and the decision in Hoover, the Court
decided California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Ahuinumn, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). After Midcal, the inquiry was no longer whether a state agency had required
the private action, but rather: (1) whether the challenged restraint had been -clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy," and (2) whether the policy
was "actively supervised by the State itself." Id. at 105. Had the test not been
changed, it might have been hard for the bar examiners to fit within the exemption.
The exam scoring system had been supervised and approved by the state Supreme
Court, for example, but not necessarily required by it as Goldfarb and Bates had
demanded.
145. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 564.
146. Id. at 573 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court vote was four to three, with
Justices Stevens, White, and Blackmun dissenting, arguing that sufficient facts had
been alleged to survive a motion to dismiss. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, both
members of the Arizona bar, did not participate. See id. at 559; cf Thomas v. Kadish,
748 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming a district court's dismissal of a suit by an appli-
cant denied admission to the Texas bar based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction to
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A third major application of Parker has been in the preservation of
unauthorized practice rules. The plaintiff in Lawline v. ABA 14 7 chal-
lenged Rules 5.4(b) and 5.5(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility which prohibit lawyer partnerships with lay
persons where any of the activities involve the practice of law and
lawyers assisting lay persons to engage in the unauthorized practice of
law. 48 The Illinois Supreme Court adopted both as part of the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct. 149
Lawline was an unincorporated association of lawyers and parale-
gals that answered legal questions over the telephone and then re-
ferred cases to lawyers who agreed to charge reduced fees. 5'
Lawyers to whom cases were referred paid Lawline a referral fee."5'
When the United States Bankruptcy Trustee reported to the Illinois
Supreme Court's Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
that paralegals at Lawline were giving legal advice to debtors and,
later, tried to enjoin Lawline from practicing law in bankruptcy cases,
Lawline filed suit alleging a conspiracy between the courts and the
organized bar to monopolize the practice of law.152
The district court dismissed the complaint, 15 3 and the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 5 4 The challenged rules had been adopted by both the
Illinois Supreme Court and the Federal District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois. While the Illinois State Bar Association, a vol-
untary bar, had issued opinions under those rules, those opinions had
no force unless the courts agreed with them, and the rest of the de-
fendants were all federal and state officials. Thus, all of the conduct
was exempt from Sherman Act liability.155
review the state court's action); Pawlak v. Nix, No. 95-5265, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14523 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1996) (dismissing complaints against bar examiners under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which says that United States district courts lack juris-
diction to review state court decisions in individual bar admission cases).
147. 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).
148. See id. at 1381.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1382. Lawline denied the charges against it and, in this case, the
court declined to address their factual accuracy. See id. at 1382 n.2.
153. See id. at 1381.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1384; see also Green v. State Bar, 27 F.3d 1083 (5th Cir. 1994) (grant-
ing Parker immunity to state committee members' unauthorized practice of law in the
face of allegations of a conspiracy to exclude lay claims adjusters from competing with
lawyers); Lender's Service, Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass'n, 758 F. Supp. 429, 434 (S.D. Ohio
1991) (holding that even when the conduct of an unauthorized practice committee
cannot be considered conduct of the state supreme court, the committee's activity can
be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and even if incor-
rect as a matter of law, committee members have Parker protection against antitrust
liability); Turner v. ABA, 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (rejecting a claim that
litigants have the right to be represented by unlicensed lay counsel); cf. Virginia State
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The final major application"5 6 of Parker immunity has been to ques-
tions of law school accreditation. Massachusetts School of Law at
Andover, Inc. v. ABA' 57 was brought by a law school that proposed to
provide "low-cost but high quality legal education and attracting mid-
life, working class, and minority students.""' To keep its tuition
around $9000 per year when that at other private law schools was
much higher, Massachusetts School of Law ("MSL") proposed to de-
liver an education that failed to comply with some ABA accreditation
standards.'5 9 In particular, it did not plan to use many full-time
faculty; it planned relatively high student-faculty ratios; and it refused
to use the LSAT or some other validated admission test."w The
school thus did not receive ABA accreditation and, allegedly as a re-
sult, it had trouble attracting students, so it sued the ABA and numer-
ous individual defendants, alleging a conspiracy to keep the cost of
legal education high.' 6'
The district court held the defendants were entitled to Parker im-
munity, 62 the Court of Appeals affirmed, 63 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari."6 The Third Circuit held that non-accreditation is
only significant insofar as a state supreme court makes an independ-
ent judgment that it will require graduation from an accredited law
school a condition of admission to the bar.165 Further, even though
the ABA's collection of faculty salary data and criticism of low sala-
ries were "price affecting," neither was shown to have determined
MSL's lack of accreditation. 166 Finally, even if ABA accreditation is
"prestigious" and thus desirable, a loss of prestige arising from refusal
Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978) (allowing the Parker
exemption to the Virginia State Bar unauthorized practice of law committee).
156. There are other isolated examples in which Parker immunity disposed of a
claim against lawyers. See, e.g., Benton, Benton & Benton v. Louisiana Public Facili-
ties Auth., 897 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a state agency was immune to a
claim that its selectio of bond counsel was arbitrary); Guralnick v. Supreme Court,
747 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that a state's mandatory fee arbitration sys-
tem was immune from antitrust challenge); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 374 A.2d
802 (R.I. 1977) (holding that the creation of a unified bar with mandatory dues does
not violate antitrust law).
157. 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997). For a good analysis of this and related cases
involving legal education and the ABA generally, see Peter James Kolovos, Note,
Antitrust Law and Nonprofit Organizations: The Law School Accreditation Case, 71
N.Y.U. L.. Rev. 689 (1996).
158. 107 F.3d at 1029.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1031.
161. See id. at 1031-32.
162. See Massachusetts School of Law at Andover v. ABA, 937 F. Supp. 435,435-46
(E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 264 (1997).
163. See Massachusetts School of Law, 107 F.3d at 1044.
164. See Massachusetts School of Law, 118 S. Ct. 264, 265 (1997).
165. See Massachusetts School of Law, 107 F.3d at 1036.
166. See id. at 1039-40.
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to approve a product or service "does not alone make out an antitrust
claim." 167
V. CASES IN WHICH AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION BY LAWYERS
HAS BEEN FOUND
Nevertheless, the bar has not dodged every bullet. First, as ac-
knowledged in Massachusetts School of Law, for many years the ABA
has collected data on the salaries of law professors, deans, librarians,
and administrators, as well as expenditures on specific law school
functions. 168 These have been used by law schools to explain to uni-
versity administrations why increases in law school funding are neces-
sary if the law school is to remain competitive. When the United
States Department of Justice asserted that such an information ex-
change could facilitate more rapid increases in the cost of education
than would otherwise occur, it fied suit against the ABA to stop it.1 69
Embroiled in the MSL litigation, the ABA quickly capitulated on this
and other matters even though, as the result in MSL suggests, 7' the
ABA ultimately might have prevailed.
Next, antitrust issues have arisen in connection with the breakup of
law firms. In Blackburn v. Sweeney,1 71 for example, four lawyers who
had composed a personal injury firm decided to become two separate
firms. Advertising was the source of their cases, and in dividing their
assets, they agreed not to compete with each other in advertising for
clients. 72 Thus, Blackburn and Green agreed not to advertise in
Sweeney and Pfeifer's agreed part of the state, and their former part-
ners returned the favor.'73 When Blackburn and Green wanted out of
the agreement, however, they asserted that it violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act as an illegal division of markets. 74 The district court
dismissed the complaint, but the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
plaintiffs.'75 While the agreement might be considered ancillary to a
valid agreement to dissolve the partnership, it was not necessary to
make the dissolution occur and its infinite duration rendered it unrea-
167. Id. at 1038 (citations omitted); see also Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295,
1304-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that the D.C. Court of Appeals is entitled to Parker
immunity for requiring graduation from an accredited school for admission to the
bar); Brandt v. ABA, No. Civ.A. 3:96-CV-2606D, 1997 WL 279762 (N.D. Tex. 1997)(granting ABA officials immunity from suit for failure to accredit Texas Wesleyan
University School of Law); Zavaletta v. ABA, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989) (al-
lowing immunity for decisions relating to CBN University School of Law).
168. See Massachusetts School of Law, 107 F.3d at 1033.
169. See id. at 1032.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
171. 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995).
172. See id. at 827.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 827, 830.
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sonable.1 76 "The restriction on advertising is thus naked, not ancillary,
and per se illegal to boot."'177
By far the most dramatic application of antitrust prohibitions to
lawyers, however, came in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n' 178 A group of about 100 lawyers in the District of Columbia
had made a career of accepting appointments to represent indigent
defendants in the criminal courts. Compensation for this work was
capped by law at thirty dollars per hour in court and twenty dollars
per hour for out-of-court time.'79 By 1982, these lawyers, supported
by other bar groups, sought an increase in rates to at least thirty-five
dollars per hour, but the increase did not pass because the Mayor said
the city could not pay for it.'8 0 The lawyers in the Association then
voted to "strike."'' They simply did not show up to receive new ap-
pointments at the usual times and within ten days the D.C. criminal
justice system "was on the brink of collapse."' s At that point, the
Mayor found the money, the city council promised to pay thirty-five
dollars per hour, and the lawyers went back to taking assignments."s
The antitrust case, however, was only beginning. Federal Trade
Commissioners learned about the strike through the news media
where it had been covered extensively. They voted to accuse strike
organizers of a "conspiracy to fix prices and conduct a [group] boy-
cott," both violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of
the FTC Act.184 An Administrative Law Judge conducted a trial and
concluded that, while the action was technically not protected as lob-
bying activity or other political action, everyone agreed the cause had
been right and "there was no harm done."'" The Commissioners dis-
176. See id. at 828.
177. Id at 829. The Court declined, however, to find treble damages an appropri-
ate remedy. See id The plaintiffs and defendants were equally responsible for the
violation, and neither suffered more than the other from the rule. See id. at 829-30.
Thus, an injunction against enforcement of the restriction was sufficient to make the
parties whole. See id at 830; cf Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993)
(holding that a restrictive covenant does not violate California Rules of Professional
Conduct); Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902 S.W.2d 739, 746 (Tex. App. 1995)
(stating that the division of markets violates the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct
but is not per se unreasonable under Texas state antitrust law).
178. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
179. The average income earned by a lawyer working on such cases full time was
about $20,000 per year. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226,
228 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
180. See Superior Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 415-16.
181. Id at 416.
182. Id. at 418 (quoting Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 544
(1986)).
183. See id
184. See id. at 418.
185. Id. at 419 (quoting Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 561
(1986)). One of the cases the strikers had cited was NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), a leading civil rights case upholding the constitutional right
of African American shoppers to boycott white merchants. Consistent with FTC r.
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agreed, however, and entered a cease and desist order based on the
ALJ's factual findings.18 6
In his opinion for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit,'87 Judge Douglas Ginsburg' offered a middle ground. The
antitrust significance of the strike depends on the market power of the
strikers, he said.'89 If they have market power, then regardless of
their motives, their conduct is per se illegal.19 If they do not have
such power, however, then their political success was due to their lob-
bying acumen, and lobbying for government favors is not an antitrust
offense.' 91 Thus, the court sent the matter back to the FIC for a de-
termination of the market power issue."
Instead, the FTC took the matter to the Supreme Court, which
ruled that the strike was per se illegal regardless of the defendants'
motives or market power.
We may assume that preboycott rates were unreasonably low, and
that the increase has produced better legal representation for indi-
gent defendants .... [But t]hese assumptions do not control the
case, for it is not our task to pass upon the social utility or political
wisdom of price-fixing agreements.
... The horizontal arrangement among these competitors was un-
questionably a "naked restraint" on price and output.
193
The Court seemed troubled by the possibility that tolerating these
lawyer-strikers would encourage an endless line of government con-
tractors to employ similar techniques. Justice Stevens quoted Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.:194
If all such conduct were immunized then, for example, competitors
would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long as
they wished to propose that price as an appropriate level for gov-
ernmental ratemaking or price supports.... Firms could claim im-
munity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions on the ground
Indiana Federation of Dentists, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 111-16, the
ALJ also found that the lawyers were not a labor union entitled to protection under
section 6 of the Clayton Act. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d at 230
n.6.
186. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. at 544.
187. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
rev'd in part, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
188. Judge Ginsburg is himself an antitrust expert. Prior to his appointment to the
bench, he headed the Antitrust Division at the U.S. Department of Justice.
189. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d at 252-53.
190. See id. at 249 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150(1940)). For a discussion of Socony-Vacuum, see supra text accompanying notes 39-
42.
191. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d at 241-42 (citing Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)). For a
discussion of Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, see supra note 56.
192. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d at 253.
193. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 421-23 (1989).
194. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
[Vol. 67
ANTITRUST LAW
that they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry and
spur legislative action.195
VI. IMPLICATION OF ANTITRUST EXPOSURE ON SOME ISSUES
LAWYERS FACE
Antitrust cases involving the legal profession make clear that law-
yers are no longer immune from liability, and Goldfarb and Superior
Court Trial Lawyers show the exposure can have consequences. On
the other hand, the practical impact of antitrust exposure has been
quite low. Most concerted activity by lawyers is coordinated through
rules adopted by their state supreme courts, and so far, that regulation
has received the benefit of Parker state action immunity. In the fu-
ture, lawyers who feel the heat of the antitrust laws are likely to be
those who ignore the benefits of having their conduct judicially man-
dated. At least three issues facing lawyers today, however, illustrate
that they must at least think about antitrust questions as they engage
in rulemaking or otherise assert their influence on evolving events.
First, for many years, specialty certification was done by official
groups within the organized bar, if at all.'96 Becoming a specialist was
not identical to receiving one's original license to practice law, but the
process could have been expected to receive similar antitrust immu-
nity. Since the Supreme Court decision in Peel v. Attorney Registra-
tion & Disciplinary Commission of Illinois,'97 however, specialty
certification may now be granted by unofficial groups who are un-
likely to have such immunity. As doctors have learned, 98 a certifying
body that does not have clearly articulated, relevant criteria, applied
on a consistent basis, runs the risk of being accused of a group boycott
or other exclusionary conduct. 199
195. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 425 (quoting Allied Tube, 486
U.S. at 503). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in part, concerned that the
Court's holding risked turning boycotts by racial minorities and others with no market
power into per se antitrust violations. See id. at 447-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In-
deed, by the time of this decision, group boycotts were no longer even per se illegal.
See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985); supra note 93. Justice Blackmun dissented in part, on the ground
that the 100 lawyers charged here obviously had no economic market power because
the D.C. courts remained free to appoint criminal defense counsel from the bar at
large. See 493 U.S. at 453-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196. See any version of Rule 7.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prior to its amendment in 1992. For examples of some of the official accrediting sys-
tems for specialists, see Richard F. Zehnle, Specialization in the Legal Profession
(1975).
197. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
198. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); supra text accompanying notes 119-
21.
199. The principle might even extend to organizations like the American Law Insti-
tute or the Association of American Law Schools, where membership gives prestige
but no additional legal rights. But see Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc.
v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1038-39 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the ABA was immune to
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Second, law schools are important profit centers for most private
universities. One of the important functions of the ABA Section on
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar has been its threat to with-
hold accreditation from law schools whose universities do not apply a
substantial majority of law student tuition to funding the law school.
As discussed earlier, the Justice Department challenged the ABA's
collection of salary and other data on the ground that it tended to
raise professors' salaries, and the ABA backed down.2"0 The long-
term effect of the consent decree is still uncertain,20' but the impact of
the loss of antitrust immunity may continue to be felt in law school
budgets.
Finally, the looming question facing the legal profession in the near
future is the effort by multi-disciplinary firms-primarily large ac-
counting firms-to deliver services long considered to be the practice
of law. Such services might include assisting the planning of mergers,
for example. The firm's accountant-partners might verify the financial
information, while the firm's lawyer-partners prepare the necessary
documents and obtain regulatory approvals.
To date, the reaction of lawyers to this development has been in-
tensely negative,0 2 in spite of the fact the ABA itself has authorized
law firms to hire non-lawyers to deliver "law-related services."20 3 Re-
sponse to this issue will be an important test of the organized bar's
ability to follow the route to antitrust safety. Here, as elsewhere, if
opposition to the development is confined to invocation of generally
applicable rules against unauthorized practice of law or practice with
non-lawyers, adopted by the authority that regulates a state's lawyers,
antitrust liability should not be a serious concern.2°
CONCLUSION
This Article began by noting a possible interplay between antitrust
exposure and today's tendency to see law as a business. Psychologi-
antitrust prosecution where its conduct did not constitute a direct attack on the plain-
tiff); supra text accompanying notes 148-62 (discussing Massachusetts School of Law).
200. The consent decree to which the ABA agreed is published at 60 Fed. Reg.
39,421 (1995).
201. One might speculate about whether doubt will be cast, for example, on the
ABA prohibition of law students receiving pay for practice externships for which the
students receive academic credit. See American Bar Association Standards for Ap-
proval of Law Schools, Interpretation 305-1 (1996); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d
1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the NCAA rule restricting what universities may
pay part-time assistant coaches violates antitrust law).
202. Incoming ABA President Philip Anderson has appointed a Commission to
study how lawyers should respond to this development. See John Gibeaut, Squeeze
Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42, 42 ("Dallas lawyer William D. Elliott sees nothing
short of a holy war on the horizon.").
203. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.7 (1992).
204. See Lawline v. ABA, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992); supra text accompanying
notes 150-58 (discussing Lawline).
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cally, that link may be valid, but this Article has shown that, if any-
thing, lawyers remain able to obtain regulatory protection for most of
their anticompetitive behavior. If the move of lawyers toward "busi-
ness" is undesirable-not by any means a matter of consensus-the
antitrust laws turn out to be neither the reason nor a valid excuse.
Notes & Observations
